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THIRD-PARTY GUILT
"It is better to risk saving a guilty man than to condemn an innocent one."
-Voltaire 1
I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose you are charged with a crime, but you are innocent. You
know you did not commit the offense, and you have evidence indicat-
ing someone else is guilty of the charged crime. Can you introduce
that evidence at your trial? Cornelius Perry could not.
Perry was accused of assaulting a woman in Golden Gate Park,
near San Francisco. The victim, who was walking through the park,
stopped a man who was jogging to ask for directions. The man then
began walking with the victim and offered her money from his wallet.
The victim refused the money, at which time the man attacked her.
The screams of the victim attracted bystanders. A witness chased the
attacker and then went to a nearby police station to ask for help. As
the witness was leaving the station, he saw a man, Cornelius Perry,
standing with his dog on the sidewalk. The witness told the police
that Perry was the man he had been chasing.2
At his trial, Cornelius Perry testified that he had never entered the
park that day. Perry wanted to support his defense by introducing
evidence that another man, Wolfe, might have committed the assault
and that the victim was confusing Perry with Wolfe. Perry's proffered
evidence consisted of the testimony of two witnesses who had been
robbed and raped by Wolfe in the same area of the park. One of these
attacks occurred exactly three years earlier, and the second occurred
only an hour before the assault with which Perry was charged. Perry
and Wolfe were both black men of similar height and weight. They
both had a distinctive "sectionally braided" hairstyle on the day of the
assault. On the afternoon of the assault, Wolfe was wearing a brown
leather jacket and blue jeans; Perry wore a light brown jacket and
blue warm-up pants. Furthermore, Wolfe had been convicted of both
of the previous attacks at the time of Perry's trial. Based on Califor-
nia Rule of Evidence 352, the trial court excluded Perry's evidence
that Wolfe may have been the assailant. California Rule of Evidence
352, virtually identical to Federal Rule of Evidence 403, prohibits the
introduction of evidence that may unfairly prejudice a party.3
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the trial court's
decision, stating that "[tihe issue was not credibility, but the probity of
the evidence compared to its tendency to divert the trial and confuse
the jury."4 The Ninth Circuit also stated that "the evidence offered by
1. VOLTAIRE, ZADIG 6 (1747), quoted in INTERNATIONAL THESAURUS OF QuoTATIoNs
334 (Rhoda Thomas Tripp & Thomas Y. Crowell eds., 3d ed. 1970).
2. Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447, 1448 (9th Cir. 1983).
3. Id. at 1449 n.1.
4. Id. at 1455.
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Perry was not so closely connected to the issue of his guilt or innocence
that its exclusion, based on its lack of probity and its tendency to con-
fuse the jury, violated due process or the right of compulsory pro-
cess."5 The Court concluded that "Perry's evidence... is sufficiently
collateral and lacking in probity on the issue of identity that its exclu-
sion did not violate the sixth and fourteenth amendments. California
may constitutionally require more cogent evidence than this before
opening up collateral issues at trial."6 Perry's proffered evidence con-
tained neither a confession of the third party nor a modus operandi
unique to both Wolfe's prior crimes and the crime with which Perry
was charged. In the court's opinion, the quantum or amount of Perry's
evidence indicating someone else committed the charged crime was
not only not cogent, it was insufficient.
In contrast, Christopher Lynn Johnson did have more cogent evi-
dence. Johnson was charged with burning down the Randolph County
High School, in Wedowee, Alabama. At his trial, Johnson wanted to
admit evidence showing that the school principal, Hulond Humphries,
committed the charged crime. Johnson argued the evidence would
show that Humphries caused considerable controversy when he stated
that he would rather cancel the school's prom than allow interracial
couples to attend. Humpries' statement and the surrounding contro-
versy and racial tension may have motivated a movement to remove
Humphries as principal of the high school. Johnson urged that Hum-
phries may have been motivated to torch the school because of anger
over interracial dating at the school and the possible loss of his job.
Johnson also wanted to admit evidence that Humphries, the week
before the fire, bought five gallons of gasoline and removed several
personal items from his office at the school. Other proffered evidence
tended to show that Humphries was alone at the school for nearly one
hour, approximately three hours before the fire. Finally, Johnson
wanted to admit evidence that Humphries twice stated to FBI agents
that he burned down the high school, although he quickly recanted
each confession.7
Johnson's proffered evidence consisted of motive and opportunity
evidence, as did Perry's. But, Johnson's evidence also consisted of a
confession to a third party. In essence, the quantum of Johnson's
third-party evidence surpassed Perry's. Johnson's defense evidence
met a sufficiency standard and was admitted at trial. Perry's evidence
failed to meet the requisite standard and the trial court declined to
admit the evidence.
This Article considers the problem of admitting evidence of a third
party's guilt. Part II will address several different approaches for
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. United States v. Johnson, 904 F. Supp. 1303, 1305 (M.D. Ala. 1995).
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dealing with the problem of admitting evidence of a third party's guilt
and will argue that under these approaches or tests, two factors are
critical to the admission of such evidence: (1) the nexus or connection
between the third party and his commission of the charged crime, as
demonstrated by the proffered evidence, and (2) the weight of that evi-
dence or the strength of that connection. Part III will argue that
under the prevailing approach in several courts, the burden of proof
has been unconstitutionally placed on the wrong party-the defend-
ant. This Article will argue that the burden is properly placed upon
the state to oppose the introduction of evidence of a third party's guilt.
This conclusion will be based on the following factors: (1) these de-
fenses are not affirmative defenses, (2) these defenses go to a critical
element of the government's case, to wit, the identity of the perpetra-
tor, which the government constitutionally has the burden of proving,
and (3) it is unconstitutional to burden the defendant with this
obligation.
II. THE CASES AND TESTS8
Third-party guilt evidence, as indicated in Perry and Johnson, is
not a fixed set of evidentiary pieces. Rather, such evidence represents
a constellation of possibilities, either excluded or admitted by the
piece or in its entirety. Sometimes motive evidence is excluded.9
Sometimes opportunity evidence is excluded.' 0 Sometimes evidence
that a third party committed other similar crimes is excluded." At
8. Professor David McCord has offered an insightful and more detailed analysis of
the various tests in his article, "But Perry Mason Made It Look So Easy!": The
Admissibility of Evidence Offered by a Criminal Defendant to Suggest That
Someone Else Is Guilty, 63 TsNN. L. REv. 917 (1996). Although Professor McCord
labels and describes his categories differently, he reaches substantially the same
conclusions concerning the test used in this Article. Professor McCord's thesis
addresses neither the burden of proof nor whether the allocation of the burden of
proof violates constitutional principles.
9. See, e.g., People v. Mendez, 223 P. 65 (Cal. 1924)(excluding third-party motive
evidence that the murder victim had an altercation with several of his Mexican
workers, other than the defendant, in the days before the murder). See also Mc-
Cord, supra note 8, at 940 (collecting cases that include "motive-type" evidence of
third-party guilt).
10. See, e.g., United States v. DeNoyer, 811 F.2d 436, 440 (8th Cir. 1986)(excluding
evidence that other "deviant sex offenders were operating in the community");
Perry v. Watts, 520 F. Supp. 550, 555 (N.D. Cal. 1981)(excluding evidence that a
third party look-a-like was in the same park), affd sub nor., Perry v. Rushen,
713 F.2d 1447 (9th Cir. 1983). See also McCord, supra note 8, at 940 (collecting
cases constituting 'opportunity-typeP evidence of third-party guilt).
11. See, e.g., Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447, 1455 (9th Cir. 1983)(excluding evidence
that a third party had 2 prior convictions for sexual assault, and 1 of those as-
saults occurred in the same park and on the same day as the charged crime). See
also McCord, supra note 8, at 943 (collecting cases constituting "similar crime-
type" evidence of third-party guilt). Professor McCord categorizes this type of
evidence of third-party guilt as propensity evidence.
1997]
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other times, a third party's confession to the commission of the crime
is admitted.12 Courts may admit or exclude evidence that the third
party looks like the accused13 or that the third party possesses or has
some connection with the property taken or destroyed.14 But what is
the benchmark for determining the admissibility of third-party guilt
evidence when the constitutional rights of the accused clash with the
right of the government to run its own trial?
Some courts use Federal Rule of Evidence 401 (or the state's ana-
logue to 401) and the principle of relevancy to determine the admissi-
bility of third-party guilt evidence.15 Other courts use a connection
test.16 Some courts use Rule 403 (the prejudice rule) to exclude such
12. See, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973)(reversing the exclusion of
the confession and recantation by a third party to a murder); United States v.
Johnson, 904 F. Supp. 1303 (M.D. Ala. 1995)(admitting the third party's confes-
sion and recantation to the FBI of burning down a high school). See also McCord,
supra note 8, at 945 (collecting cases constituting "confession-type" evidence of
third-party guilt). Professor McCord categorizes this type of evidence under the
heading of confession/physical evidence.
13. See, e.g., United States v. Green, 786 F.2d 247, 252 (7th Cir. 1986)(admitting that
the third party, a co-worker of the accused, looked like the defendant); Perry v.
Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447, 1455 (9th Cir. 1983)(excluding evidence that the third
party looked like the defendant and wore a similar style and color of clothing);
United States v. Armstrong, 621 F.2d 951, 953 (9th Cir. 1980)(admitting evidence
that a person other than the defendant matched the description of the robber);
United States v. Robinson, 544 F.2d 110, 112 (2d Cir. 1976)(admitting evidence
that a third party suspected of 2 armed robberies within 6 days of the charged
robbery looked like the man on the surveillance video); State v. Echols, 524 A.2d
1143, 1148 (Conn. 1987)(admitting evidence of a third party look-a-like). See also
McCord, supra note 8, at 944 (collecting cases constituting "look-a-like-type" evi-
dence of third-party guilt). Professor McCord categorizes this type of evidence
under the heading mistaken identity.
14. See United States v. Armstrong, 621 F.2d 951, 953 (9th Cir. 1980)(admitting evi-
dence that a third party had "used $3,000 in bait bills taken from the [charged
bank robbery] to purchase a car the day after that robbery occurred"). See also
McCord, supra note 8, at 919-36 (collecting cases constituting "connection-type"
evidence of third-party guilt). Professor McCord categorizes this type of evidence
of third-party guilt as direct connection evidence.
15. See, e.g., United States v. DeNoyer, 811 F.2d 436, 440 (8th Cir. 1987)(finding
irrelevant and upholding the exclusion of evidence (in a sodomy trial involving a
5-year-old victim) that the defendant's wife's brother "undressed a five-year old
girl" and that a "neighbor two houses away ... committed sodomy" a year ear-
lier); United States v. Armstrong, 621 F.2d 951, 953 (9th Cir. 1980)("The district
court excluded the evidence as irrelevant.... We hold it was error to exclude as
irrelevant testimony that another man, matching the description of the... [blank
robber, had used bait money taken in that robbery to purchase a car."); United
States v. Johnson, 904 F. Supp. 1303, 1307 (M.D. Ala. 1995)(holding that evi-
dence that the third party "started the fire meets the requirements of Rules 401
[and] 402 for... admissibility"). See also Commonwealth v. Scott, 564 N.E.2d
370 (Mass. 1990)(upholding the exclusion of evidence that others committed the
charged crime on relevancy grounds).
16. See, e.g., People v. Arline, 13 Cal. App. 3d 200, 203 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970)(stating
that there were no facts to "connect [the third party] with the crime"); State v.
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evidence,i7 while still other courts use the United States Supreme
Court's balancing test's in conjunction with a "critical and reliable"
twist.' 9 Others have adopted a reasonable doubt test,20 while other
courts apply a combination of all of the tests.2 ' These various tests
will be examined below.
A. The Relevancy Test
When applying the relevancy test, courts use Federal Rules of Evi-
dence 401 and 402 (or their state analogues) to determine whether to
admit or exclude third-party guilt evidence. Rule 402 provides that
Giguere, 439 A.2d 1040, 1043 (Conn. 1981)("We have stated: 'Ordinarily, evi-
dence concerning a third party's involvement is not admissible until there is some
evidence which directly connects that third party with the crime."). See also
State v. Koedatich, 548 A.2d 939, 978-79 (N.J. 1988)(collecting state and federal
cases admitting and excluding evidence based on the existence or nonexistence of
a link or "connection" between the "third party and the victim or the crime");
McCord, supra note 8, at 920-36 (collecting cases applying a connection test in
determining the admissibility of evidence of third-party guilt).
17. See United States v. Johnson, 904 F. Supp. 1303, 1307 (M.D. Ala. 1995)(stating
"[elvidence that [the third party] started the fire meets the requirements of
Rule[] ... 403 for admissibility"). See also People v. Hall, 718 P.2d 99, 104 (Cal.
1986). In Hall, the court stated that
courts should simply treat third-party culpability evidence like any other
evidence: if relevant it is admissible (Section 350) unless its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the risk of undue delay, prejudice,
or confusion (Section 352)[California's Section 352 is the analog to Fed-
eral Evidence Rule 403]....
Furthermore, courts must focus on the actual degree of risk that the
admission of relevant evidence may result in undue delay, prejudice, or
confusion. As Wigmore observed, "if the evidence is really of no appreci-
able value no harm is done in admitting it; but if the evidence is in truth
calculated to cause the jury to doubt, the court should not attempt to
decide for the jury that this doubt is purely speculative and fantastic but
should afford the accused every opportunity to create that doubt."
Id (internal citations omitted). See also McCord, supra note 8, at 936-37 (collect-
ing cases applying a Rule 403 test).
18. See Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447, 1450 (9th Cir. 1983)("The Supreme Court
seems to have applied a balancing test to resolve such conflicts [the clash between
state rules and the defendant's right to introduce evidence], weighing the interest
of the defendant against the state interest in the evidentiary rule.").
19. Id. at 1455.
20. See People v. Hall, 718 P.2d 99, 104 (Cal. 1986)("[T]hird party evidence need not
show 'substantial proof of a probability' that the third person committed the act;
it need only be capable of raising a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt."). See
also McCord, supra note 8, at 937-38 (collecting cases applying a reasonable
doubt test).
21. The Ninth Circuit, referring to the Supreme Court's balancing test, mentioned
that the "connection of the proffered evidence to the defendant's case is tenuous."
Perry v. Rushan, 713 F.2d 1447, 1454 (9th Cir. 1983). It also said the "evidence
... possessed only slight probative value" and that "Perry's proffered evidence
falls far short of the critical and reliable evidence considered in Chambers [v.




"all relevant evidence is admissible,"22 and Rule 401 defines relevant
evidence as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."23
Although these courts use the language of the "relevancy rules" when
discussing the relevancy test, in effect they look to the weight and the
sufficiency of the evidence in connecting the third party with the crime
charged. Courts analyze the strength of the nexus between the prof-
fered evidence and the guilt of the third party, and this analysis effec-
tively places the burden of proof on the defendant.
In State v. McElrath,24 the North Carolina Supreme Court used
the relevancy test in determining the admissibility of third-party guilt
evidence. McElrath wanted to admit a map of his summer home,
which was found on the victim of the homicide. The defense theorized
that the map indicated the victim had planned to burglarize the de-
fendant's home and that one of the victim's co-conspirators, not the
defendant, had killed the victim. In reversing the trial court's exclu-
sion of the evidence, the McElrath court stated that
the relevance standard to be applied in this and other cases is relatively lax.
After all, evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more prob-
able than it would be without the evidence.... We note also that the standard
in criminal cases is particularly easily satisfied. "Any evidence calculated to
throw light upon the crime charged" should be admitted by the court.2 5
Federal Rule of Evidence 401 "[c]ontains a very expansive defini-
tion of relevant evidence," 26 and the relevancy standard in criminal
cases is "particularly easily satisfied."27 "[1In determining whether
evidence is relevant, the district court must not consider the weight or
sufficiency of the evidence," 28 and "evidence need not prove the propo-
sition for which it is offered to be probative."29 As stated by the Sixth
Circuit, "[e]ven if a district court believes the evidence is insufficient
to prove the ultimate point for which it is offered, it may not exclude
the evidence if it has even the slightest probative worth."30 One state
supreme court stated that "the relevance standard to be applied... [in
a case dealing with third-party guilt evidence] and other cases is rela-
tively lax."31
22. FED. R. EvID. 402.
23. FED. R. EVD. 401.
24. 366 S.E.2d 442 (N.C. 1988).
25. Id. at 449 (internal citation omitted).
26. United States v. Curtis, 568 F.2d 643, 645 (9th Cir. 1978).
27. State v. McElrath, 366 S.E.2d 442, 449 (N.C. 1988).
28. Douglass v. Eaton Corp., 956 F.2d 1339, 1344 (6th Cir. 1992).
29. Smith v. Georgia, 684 F.2d 729, 736 (11th Cir. 1982).
30. Douglass v. Eaton Corp., 956 F.2d 1339, 1344 (6th Cir. 1992).
31. State v. McElrath, 366 S.E.2d 442, 449 (N.C. 1988).
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But despite the laxness of the rules of relevancy, courts do exclude
third-party guilt evidence by placing the burden of proof on the ac-
cused. In State v. Renteria,32 the court addressed the insufficiency of
the evidence when applying the relevancy test and ultimately denied
the defendant's request to introduce evidence of the prior records of
two different third parties. Renteria sought to show, in a possession of
heroin case, that the two people accompanying the defendant at the
time of his arrest actually possessed the heroin. The -court excluded
the evidence, however, stating that
[t]he evidence shows by the unequivocal testimony of the police officers that
the defendant was the one person in possession of the heroin. The defendant
offered no support for his theory that the [third parties] were in possession of
the heroin, he never attempted to subpoena them nor did he testify that they
were in possession of the heroin.
3 3
The court, in excluding the proffered evidence, placed the burden of
production on Renteria. Had the defendant subpoenaed the two indi-
viduals, or at least attempted to, the court implied that the proffered
evidence would have been admissible.
B. The Connection Test
Applying the connection test, courts determine the relevancy of ev-
idence of third-party guilt by examining whether the proffered defense
evidence directly connects the third party with the charged crime.
The courts applying this test use the language of connection, but actu-
ally look to the strength of the nexus between the proffered evidence
and the guilt of the third party for the crime charged, thus placing the
burden of production on the accused.
The Connecticut Supreme Court, in Siemon v. Stoughton,3 4 applied
the connection test. The Siemon trial court excluded testimony show-
ing that a third party, matching the composite drawing of the assail-
ant, could be placed at the scene of the crime on at least three
occasions, months before the charged assault. The Connecticut high
court reversed the trial court because "[tihe unusual fact of encounter-
ing a nude man in the same area on three occasions was enough to
connect the nude man to the crime with sufficient directness to render
the evidence admissible."3 5
Courts admitting third-party guilt evidence pursuant to the con-
nection test rely on the quantum of evidence adduced by the ac-
cused, 36 while those excluding such evidence tend to rely on the lack
32. 520 P.2d 316 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974).
33. Id. at 317.
34. 440 A.2d 210 (Conn. 1981).
35. Id. at 214.
36. See State v. Hamlette, 276 S.E.2d 338, 345 (N.C. 1981). In Hamlette, the defend-
ant sought to show that the third party had killed the victim because the victim
and the third party were rivals for the affection of one Debbie Moss. The defend-
1997] 279
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of evidence presented.3 7 In State v. Denny,38 the court used the con-
nection test to exclude evidence that third parties had motives to kill
the decedent. In addressing the insufficiency of the defendant's evi-
dence of third-party guilt, or the quantum deficiency of such evidence,
the court said that "[w]hile motive has been established, no evidence
of either opportunity or direct connection to the crime was proffered.
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refus-
ing to admit this testimony."39 Again, the court established an evi-
dentiary threshold, a burden of production. If the defendant meets his
burden and is able to produce motive evidence or evidence directly
connecting the third party with the crime, his other evidence is admis-
sible. But if he cannot secure such additional evidence, all of the evi-
dence is inadmissible.
ant sought to show that the third party initially had been arrested and charged
with the shooting, had been present at Moss' house on the day of the shooting,
had been chased by the decedent out of Moss' house, had told defendant minutes
after the shooting to keep quiet about the shooting, and had lied about the loca-
tion of the gun used in the shooting. Id. See also Commonwealth v. Keizer, 385
N.E.2d 1001, 1004 (Mass. 1979). The Keizer court found
substantial connecting links between the offense charged and the subse-
quent crime .... Both offenses involved a crime of the same type, com-
mitted by similar methods in the same vicinity of Boston, by three males
of similar description. In addition, similar weapons were used, not just
in the generic sense, but in terms of specific characteristics: what ap-
peared to be a square-barrelled pistol and a sawed off shotgun concealed
by a paper bag.
Id.
37. See State v. Sturdivant, 155 A.2d 771, 778 (N.J. 1959). In Sturdivant, the defend-
ant, charged with the sodomy-murder of his 4-year-old stepdaughter, sought to
admit evidence that his 3-year-old niece had inserted a can opener into the va-
gina and rectum of the deceased 7 days before the date of the charged crime. But
the Sturdivant court excluded such evidence stating "[t]here was no suggestion
that defendant could prove the precise injuries allegedly sustained a week before
death and then trace a fatal course." Id. See also State v. Marshall, 353 A.2d
756, 760-61 (Conn. 1974). In Marshall, the defendant sought to introduce evi-
dence that other people had a motive to kill the victim. But, the Marshall court
excluded such evidence stating that
evidence of the motive of one other than the defendant to commit the
crime will be excluded where there is no other proof in the case which
tends to connect such other person with the offense.... The defendant
made no offer of proof to connect anyone else with the murder....
Id. In People v. Luigs, 421 N.E.2d 961 (IlM. App. Ct. 1981), the defendant at-
tempted to introduce a second knife found at the crime scene 24 hours after the
assault, asserting that this second knife belonged to the victim's true assailant.
The Luigs court, however, excluded the knife, stating that "[t]he record reveals a
complete lack of testimony connecting the second knife to the crime." Id. at 966.
38. 357 N.W.2d 12 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984).
39. Id. at 18.
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C. The 403 Test
Courts also use Federal Rule of Evidence 403 (or a state analogue)
to determine the admissibility of third-party guilt evidence. Rule 403
provides that "although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its pro-
bative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair preju-
dice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation
of cumulative evidence."40 Although the courts applying the 403 test
consider whether the proffered evidence is likely to confuse or mislead
the jury, these courts suggest that if enough evidence connecting the
third party to the crime charged is present, the evidence will be ad-
missible because it will not confuse and mislead the jury.
In United States v. Perkins,41 the Ninth Circuit determined the ad-
missibility of third-party guilt evidence according to Rule 403. In Per-
kins, the defendant in a bank robbery case sought to admit evidence
pertaining to certain bank robbery counts that had been dismissed by
the government. The defendant contended that the modus operandi of
all of the crimes demonstrated that the same man committed each
robbery, and therefore the evidence was admissible under Federal
Rule of Evidence 404, the similar crimes evidence rule. Nevertheless,
the Perkins court excluded the proffered evidence, stating that the
"modus operandi of the dismissed counts is not sufficiently similar to
the charged offense to support an inference of identity and warrant
admission under Rule 404(b)."42 The court relied on Rule 403 to ex-
clude the proffered evidence. In doing so, the court stated that "even if
the evidence was properly admissible under Rule 404(b), it must nev-
ertheless undergo the probative-prejudice balancing required under
Rule 403 and may be excluded if the jury is likely to be confused or
misled."43 The Perkins court reasoned that the evidence was not "pro-
bative of identity under Rule 404(b) and [was] likely to mislead or con-
fuse the jury under Rule 403."44 The court concluded that it was not
an abuse of discretion to focus on the offense and to avoid distraction
that would be caused by discussing "the details of several extraneous
robberies."45
Arguably, if Perkins had produced more evidence to show the third
party's prior crimes were similar to the charged crime, the evidence
would have not only been admissible under Rule 404(b), but it also
would have passed muster under Rule 403 because the prior robberies
would not have been extraneous. This argument also demonstrates
40. FED. R. Evm. 403.
41. 937 F.2d 1397 (9th Cir. 1990).
42. Id. at 1400.





that when courts rely on the Rule 403 test, the burden of proof is
placed on the accused. Thus, if the accused can submit enough evi-
dence of similarity, it is admissible; if not, it is inadmissible.
D. The Balancing Test
Some courts use the balancing test to determine the admissibility
of evidence of a third party's guilt. Although this test weighs the in-
terests of the accused in proving his innocence against the state's in-
terest in convicting the guilty, the ultimate admissibility decision is
based on the strength of the evidence implicating the third party in
the crime.
The balancing test weighs and evaluates the following two inter-
ests: (1) the legitimate interests of the defendant to present a defense,
and (2) the interests of the state to administer fair and reliable trials.
In Perry v. Rushen,46 the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of federal
habeas corpus relief by upholding the exclusion of Cornelius Perry's
proffered third-party guilt evidence. The court set forth the following
procedure for administering the balancing part of the test:
[T]he court must balance the importance of the evidence against the state in-
terest in exclusion. In evaluating the significance of the evidence, the court
should consider all of the circumstances: its probative value on the central
issue, its reliability, whether it is capable of evaluation by the finder of fact,
whether it is the sole evidence on the issue or merely cumulative and whether
it constitutes a major part of the attempted defense. The weight of the state's
interest likewise depends upon many factors. The court must determine the
purpose of the rule, its importance, how well the purpose applies in the case at
hand. The court must give due weight to the substantial state interest in pre-
serving orderly trials, in judicial efficiency, in excluding unreliable or prejudi-
cial evidence.
4 7
But there is a twist to the balancing test. Even after evaluating, bal-
ancing, and weighing the diverse interests, "[wihere the state interest
is strong, only the exclusion of critical, reliable, and highly probative
evidence will violate due process. When the state interest is weaker,
less significant evidence is protected."4s
The Perry court applied the balancing test, concluding that the
state had a strong interest in the case. In contrast, Perry's evidence
fell "far short of" meeting a standard of "critical and reliable" evi-
dence.4 9 Again, had Perry's evidence more directly connected the
third party with the crime charged, it would have been admissible. In
this regard, had more evidence connected the third party with the
crime, and had the accused met his burden of proof, the court would
have admitted the defendant's evidence.
46. 713 F.2d 1447 (9th Cir. 1983).
47. Id. at 1452-53.
48. Id. at 1452.
49. Id. at 1455.
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E. The Reasonable Doubt Test
The reasonable doubt test evaluates whether evidence tending to
implicate another person must be admitted. Accordingly, if the evi-
dence is of sufficient probative value to raise a reasonable doubt as to
the defendant's guilt, it is admissible. Note that courts openly place
the burden of proof upon the defendant.
In State v. Conlogue,50 the woman who lived with the defendant
confessed to committing an assault, the same crime with which the
defendant was charged. The trial court excluded this evidence. The
Maine Supreme Court reversed, finding the evidence admissible
under the reasonable doubt test. The Conlogue court state that
evidence tending to implicate another person, and deflect guilt from the de-
fendant, must be admitted if it is of sufficient probative value to raise a rea-
sonable doubt as to the defendant's culpability. As we stated in LeClair,
"[T]he court should allow the defendant 'wide latitude' to present all the
evidence relevant to his defense, unhampered by piecemeal rulings on
admissibility."51
Citing other sources as authority, the Conlogue court concluded
that if the proffered evidence of third-party guilt was "too speculative
or conjectural or too disconnected from the facts of the case against the
defendant."52 In finding the evidence of third-party guilt admissible
in Conlogue, the evidence was sufficiently connected to be admissible.
In short, Conlogue had met his burden of proof.
F. Combination of Tests
Many courts use combinations of the various tests when determin-
ing the admissibility of evidence of third-party guilt. These same
courts, however, also rely on the strength of the connection between
the evidence of a third party's guilt and the commission of the crime
charged. For example in Perry v. Rushen,53 the court used the balanc-
ing test, but ultimately excluded the third-party guilt evidence on rel-
evancy grounds because the "evidence . . . possessed only slight
probative value on the reliability of the identification."54
The testimony concerning Wolfe would show that another black man, of
roughly Perry's height and weight, wearing braided hair and somewhat simi-
lar clothing was near the scene an hour before and had a history of sexual
assaults. The identification of Perry, however, was strong. The victim posi-
tively identified Perry only minutes after the attack. Wolfe had no dog. Wolfe
lacked the prominent forehead scar that Perry has, and does not resemble
Perry in facial features. Wolfe was clean shaven, while Perry wore a mous-
50. 474 A.2d 167 (Me. 1984).
51. Id. at 172 (citing State v. Le Clair, 425 A.2d 182, 186 (Me. 1981)).
52. Id.
53. 713 F.2d 1447 (9th Cir. 1983).
54. Id. at 1454.
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tache and chin whiskers. Finally, although both wore blue pants, Wolfe's
jeans were not likely to be mistaken for the warm-up pants worn by Perry.5 5
Although the Perry court used a balancing test, it actually imposed
on Perry the burden of production. If Perry had more evidence, it
would have been admissible. If Wolfe had, either collectively or indi-
vidually, a dog, a scar, facial hair, or blue warm-up pants, Perry's evi-
dence presumably would have constituted a sufficient quantum to
satisfy the test.
The Eleventh Circuit, in Cikora v. Dugger,S6 combined the balanc-
ing test with the connection test. In Cikora, several witnesses identi-
fied the defendant as a burglar. The defendant sought to present to
the jury a third party who the defendant had met in jail. The third
party lived in the neighborhood where the burglary took place and fit
the witnesses' description of the burglar. In affirming the exclusion of
this evidence, the Cikora court provided the following reasoning:
As the Ninth Circuit explained in Perry, determining what due process man-
dates in these cases requires a balancing of interests. The Defendant cer-
tainly has a strong interest in presenting exculpatory evidence, but the state
has an interest in promoting reliable trials, particularly in preventing the in-
jection of collateral issues into the trial through unsupported speculation
about the guilt of another party. Due process may require a trial court to
allow the introduction of evidence of another party's possible guilt when there
is some showing of a nexus between the other party and the particular crime
with which a defendant is charged. Cikora has made no such showing. 5 7
In State v. Caulk,5s the court mixed the reasonable doubt test and
the connection test. In excluding evidence that several unindicted
persons may have had a motive to kill the decedent, the court stated
that "[e]xculpatory evidence 'must be admitted if it is of sufficient pro-
bative value to raise a reasonable doubt, as to defendant's culpability.'
However, if the evidence is 'too speculative or conjectural or too dis-
connected from the facts of the case against the defendant,' the court
has discretion to exclude it."59 The Caulk court found that "t]he prof-
fered evidence was based almost entirely on hearsay. It contained no
specific exculpatory references to other individuals who might have
had the motive, intent and opportunity to murder [the victim] ... ."60
In essence, the Caulk court excluded the defense evidence because
Caulk failed to meet his burden of production. Had Caulk's evidence
contained less hearsay and/or contained a reference to a specific third
party, his evidence would have had more quantum, and hence, would
have been admissible.
55. Id.
56. 840 F.2d 893 (11th Cir. 1988).
57. Id. at 898 (footnotes omitted).
58. 543 A.2d 1366 (Me. 1988).




In People v. Hall,6 1 evidence that a third party had the motive and
opportunity to commit the charged crime was excluded under the com-
bination test. The court commented on the failure of the accused to
submit a sufficient quantum of third-party guilt evidence. The Hall
court set forth the rule that
to be admissible, the third party guilt evidence need not show "substantial
proof of a probability" that the third person committed the act .... At the
same time, we do not require that any evidence, however remote, must be
admitted .... As this court observed in Mendez, evidence of mere motive or
opportunity... without more, will not suffice.6 2
Again, Hall put the burden of production on the defendant. Because
the defense failed to produce enough evidence, what evidence they did
have was kept from the jury.
Regardless of the test used, admissibility of evidence of third-party
guilt is made on the basis of the weight or strength of the proffered
evidence indicating someone else committed the crime charged. If the
connection is strong, the evidence is admitted. If it is weak, it is ex-
cluded. Courts, in this regard, are placing a burden of proof on the
accused for the admission of evidence that someone else committed
the crime charged. But, is this constitutional?
III. BURDENS, AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES, AND DEFENSE
RIGHTS
Although courts are determining the admissibility of evidence of
third-party guilt under various tests, the United States Supreme
Court has not addressed the issue of the constitutionality of placement
of the burden of proof under any of the above-described tests. The gist
of the argument is that although a court can place a burden of proof on
the accused to prove an affirmative defense such as insanity or self-
defense, a court cannot place a burden of proof on the accused when he
seeks to admit evidence that disputes the elements of a crime. The
state constitutionally bears the burden of proving every element of a
criminal charge, and that burden cannot be shifted to the accused.
Furthermore, in every criminal charge, the identity of the perpetrator
is an element of the crime. When the defendant seeks to present evi-
dence of third-party guilt, the defendant is attacking the identity ele-
ment of the offense. Unlike the insanity defense, when the defendant
is disproving the identity element, the defendant does not admit the
element and then present an affirmative defense-a justification or
excuse-for committing the crime. Instead, the defendant introduces
evidence to show that the prosecution has failed to meet its burden of
proving the identity element of the offense.
61. 718 P.2d 99 (Cal. 1986).
62. Id. at 104.
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A. Burdens of Proof and Affirmative Defenses
The state has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
every element of the crime charged, and it cannot shift that burden to
the defendant. These are firmly established principles of federal con-
stitutional law. The state must prove two elements in every criminal
prosecution: (1) that a crime occurred, and (2) that the defendant is
the person who committed the crime. The state cannot shift the bur-
den of proof of either of these elements to the defendant. In a criminal
trial, the prosecution adduces facts in support of its claim against the
accused, and the defendant adduces facts in support of her defense.
The jury has the obligation of resolving the factual dispute. Rules
guide the jury in this process. Two such rules establish two different
burdens of proof: the burden of production and the burden of persua-
sion. Although the government has some latitude in drafting statutes
and rules of evidence or procedure allocating these two different bur-
dens of proof to either the prosecution or the defense,6 3 the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the United States Constitution places limits on this
discretion.64 Burdens of production establish the party with the re-
sponsibility to adduce evidence on a claim, how much evidence must
63. [It is normally "within the power of the State to regulate procedures
under which its laws are carried out, including the burden of producing
evidence and the burden of persuasion," and its decision in this regard is
not subject to proscription under the Due Process Clause unless "it of-
fends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience
of our people as to be ranked as fimdamental."
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02 (1977)(citations omitted).
The State normally may shift to the defendant the burden of production,
that is, the burden of going forward with sufficient evidence "to justify [a
reasonable] doubt upon the issue." If the defendant's evidence does not
cross this threshold, the issue-be it malice, extreme emotional distur-
bance, self-defense, or whatever-will not be submitted to the jury.
Id. at 230-31 (footnotes and citations omitted). "On many occasions, this Court
has sustained a trial court's refusal to submit an issue to the jury in a criminal
case when the defendant failed to meet his burden of production." Id. at 231 n.18.
64. There are outer limits on shifting the burden of production to a defend-
ant, limits articulated in a long line of cases in this Court passing on the
validity of presumptions. Most important are the "rational connection"
requirement of Mobile, J. & K.C. R. Co. v. Turnipseed ... and also the
"comparative convenience" criterion of Morrison v. California .... Cau-
tion is appropriate, however, in generalizing about the application of any
of these cases to a given procedural device, since the term "presumption"
covers a broad range of procedural mechanisms having significantly dif-
ferent consequences for the defendant.
Id. at 230-31 n.16 (citations omitted).
Dean McCormick emphasized that the burden of production is "a critical
and important mechanism in a jury trial." In his view, "this mechanism
has far more influence upon the final outcome of cases than does the
burden of persuasion, which has become very largely a matter of the
technique of the wording of instructions to juries."
Id. at 232 n.19 (citing CHARLEs T. McCoRMICI, EVIDENCE § 307, at 638-639, 639
n.2 (1st ed. 1954)).
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be adduced on that claim, and what happens if the burdened party
fails to introduce enough evidence to prove the claim. 65 The govern-
ment bears the burden of proving each of the elements of a crime. 6 6
As to how much evidence proving these elements must be adduced,
there must be enough that a "rational trier of fact" could find "the es-
sential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."67 If the
government fails to meet its burden of proving each of the elements
beyond a reasonable doubt, the trial court must direct a verdict of ac-
quittal at the close of the state's case.68
65. See generally JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAwv 51-61 (1987);
McCoMiUICK ON EVIDENCE §§ 336-341 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).
66. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 215 (1977)(citing Mullaney v. Wilbur,
421 U.S. 684 (1975), for the proposition that "a State must prove every ingredient
of an offense"). See also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 (1979)(citing In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970), as the first case to hold that "the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a defendant in a criminal case
against conviction 'except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact nec-
essary to constitute the crime with which he is charged). In Jackson, the de-
fendant was convicted of first degree murder. The Court, in discussing the
elements of first degree murder stated that "[piremeditation, or specific intent to
kill, distinguishes murder in the first from murder in the second degree; proof of
this element is essential to conviction of the former offense, and the burden ofprov-
ing it clearly rests with the prosecution." Id. at 309 (citations omitted)(emphasis
added).
67. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). The Jackson Court stated that
"[i]n Winship, the Court held for the first time that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment protects a defendant in a criminal case against convic-
tion 'except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to con-
stitute the crime with which he is charged.- Id. at 315 (citations omitted). The
Court in Winship stated:
The requirement that guilt of a criminal charge be established by
proof beyond a reasonable doubt dates at least from our early years as a
Nation.... Expressions in many opinions of this Court indicate that it
has long been assumed that proof of a criminal charge beyond a reason-
able doubt is constitutionally required.
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970).
68. See, e.g., FLA. R. Cmni. P. 3.380(a):
If, at the close of the evidence for the state or at the close of all the evi-
dence in the case, the court is of the opinion that the evidence is insuffi-
cient to warrant a conviction, it may, and on the motion of the




As to affirmative defenses,69 the defendant can be made to bear the
burden of production.70 There is no concensus as to the quantum of
evidence that must be adduced by a defendant who carries the burden
of production. In some cases, the defendant must adduce more than a
scintilla of evidence,71 and but other courts require enough evidence
to raise a reasonable doubt.72 Regardless of the standard, if the de-
fendant fails to adduce enough evidence, the court will refuse to in-
69. Affirmative defenses are defined by the Model Penal Code of the American Law
Institute as "a matter of excuse or justification peculiarly within the knowledge of
the defendant on which he can fairly be required to adduce supporting evidence."
MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12(3)(c) (1985). An affirmative defense is also usually
defined by the various jurisdictions to be "an excuse or justification peculiarly
within the knowledge of the accused, on which he can fairly be required to adduce
supporting evidence." Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 230 (1987)(quoting from the
Ohio self-defense statute). In Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952), and Patter-
son v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977), the Supreme Court has approved designat-
ing insanity and extreme emotional distress as affirmative defenses. Each fit the
definition of an affirmative defense. Each defense involves an excuse orjustifica-
tion for committing the act, and in each, the facts justifying the defense are pecu-
liarly within the knowledge of the accused. But third-party guilt evidence is
neither a justification nor excuse because the facts are not peculiarly within the
knowledge of the accused. In fact, the identity of other suspects is usually within
the knowledge of the police, if not the prosecutor. Evidence that someone else
committed the crime and that the defendant is innocent goes to the proof of an
element of the crime because the identity of the criminal is always an element of
the prosecutions case in chief. If the prosecutor fails to establish identity, ajudg-
ment of acquittal is appropriate.
70. See generally DRESSLER, supra note 65, § 7.02(B). See also Martin v. Ohio, 480
U.S. 228 (1987)(upholding the placement of the burden of persuasion-and by
implication the burden of production-on the defendant to prove self-defense by a
preponderance of the evidence); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977)(up-
holding the placement of the burden of persuasion-and by implication the bur-
den of production-on the accused to prove the affirmative defense of extreme
emotional distress by a preponderance of the evidence); Leland v. Oregon, 343
U.S. 790 (1953)(upholding the placement of the burden of persuasion-and by
implication the burden of production-on the accused to prove insanity beyond a
reasonable doubt).
71. See McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847, 849 (D.C. Cir. 1962). The McDon-
ald court stated that
[u]nder Davis v. United States... if there is "some evidence" supporting
the defendant's claim of mental disability, he is entitled to have that
issue submitted to the jury. Under Durham v. United States .... evi-
dence of a "mental disease" or "mental defect" raises the issue. The sub-
ject matter being what it is, there can be no sharp quantitative or
qualitative definition of "some evidence." Certainly it means more than
a scintilla, yet, of course, the amount need not be so substantial as to
require, if uncontroverted, a directed verdict of acquittal.
Id. (citations and footnotes omitted).
72. See Frazier v. Weatherholtz, 572 F.2d 994, 995 (4th Cir. 1978)(upholding a Vir-
ginia jury instruction placing on the defendant the burden of proving self-de-




struct the jury on the defense.7 3 In essence, the court "directs a
verdict on the issue of the defense." 74
Burdens of persuasion inform the parties as to which party has the
burden of persuading the jury on the particular element or defense,
how much evidence must be adduced on the claim to prevail, and what
happens if the burdened party fails to adduce sufficient evidence. The
prosecution carries the burden of persuasion on the elements of the
offense and must prove each of those elements beyond a reasonable
doubt.75 The defendant is entitled to a judgment of acquittal if the
prosecution fails to carry its burden.76
The defense can be made to bear the burden of persuasion on af-
firmative defenses.77 It is constitutionally permissible to require the
defendant to prove such defenses beyond a reasonable doubt,7s
although most states assigning the burden to the defendant have re-
quired only proof by a preponderance of the evidence.7 9 But do third-
party guilt defenses constitute affirmative defenses?
73. PAUL H. ROBINSON, CR=INAL LAW DEFENSES § 4(a), at 20 n.7 (1984)("[i]n these
cases the court, in effect, directs a verdict on the issue of the defense7)(citing
cases affirming the refusal to give jury instructions on duress, necessity, and in-
sanity where defendants had failed to satisfy their burdens of production).
74. Id.
75. The government in a criminal case carries the burden of proving the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Justice Frankfurter stated that "[i]t is the
duty of the Government to establish... guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This
notion-basic in our law and rightly one of the boasts of a free society-is a re-
quirement and a safeguard of due process of law in the historic, procedural con-
tent of'due process.' Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 802-03 (1952)(Frankfurter,
J., dissenting). See also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970)(quoting Justice
Frankfurter and stating "that it has long been assumed that proof of a criminal
charge beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required"). The defendant
does not have the burden of proving himself innocent. See Leland v. Oregon, 343
U.S. 790, 804 (1952)(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)("the State must prove guilt, not
the defendant innocence, and prove it to the satisfaction of a jury beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.").
76. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing FLA. R. CP. P. 3.380(a)).
77. See Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987)(upholding the placement of the burden of
persuasion on the defendant to prove the affirmative defense of self-defense); Pat-
terson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977)(upholding the placement of the burden
of persuasion on the accused to prove the affirmative defense of extreme emo-
tional distress); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952)(upholding the placement
of the burden of persuasion on the defendant to prove the affirmative defense of
insanity).
78. See Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952)(upholding the placement of the burden
of persuasion on the accused to prove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt).
79. See Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987)(upholding the placement of the burden of
persuasion on the defendant to prove self-defense by a preponderance of the evi-
dence); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977)(upholding the placement of
the burden of persuasion on the accused to prove the affirmative defense of ex-
treme emotional distress by a preponderance of the evidence).
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Does evidence that someone other than the accused committed the
crime constitute an affirmative defense, or does it negate an element
of the crime? The distinction is crucial. If evidence of a third party's
guilt is in the nature of an affirmative defense, the government can
place a burden of persuasion on the accused wishing to raise such a
defense. But, if such a defense negates an element of the crime, i.e.,
the identity of the accused as the perpetrator, it is unconstitutional to
exclude such evidence by shifting the burden of production or persua-
sion for third-party guilt to the accused.
Defenses can be divided into two categories: defenses that negate
the elements of a crime,80 and affirmative defenses8l that seek to ex-
plain, justify, or excuse the conduct of the accused.8 2 Examples of de-
fenses that negate elements of the crime charged include alibi,
mistake, and impossibility.83 Examples of defenses that constitute af-
firmative defenses or justification/excuse defenses include self-de-
fense, defense of others, and insanity.84
Third-party guilt evidence is not an affirmative defense for three
reasons. First, it does not meet the common definition of the term
"affirmative defense." Second, defendants possess a constitutional
right to raise the defense of third-party guilt, whereas defendants
have no constitutional right to raise affirmative defenses. Third, the
defense of third-party guilt is in the nature of an alibi defense and the
defense of alibi is not an affirmative defense.
First, the Florida Supreme Court, in State v. Cohen,85 embraced
the opportunity to define affirmative defenses when it said
an "affirmative defense" is any defense that assumes the complaint or charges
to be correct but raises other facts that, if true, would establish a valid excuse
or justification or a right to engage in the conduct in question. An affirmative
defense does not concern itself with the elements of the offense at all; it con-
cedes them. In effect, an affirmative defense says, "Yes, I did it, but I had a
good reason."8 6
A third-party guilt defense clearly is not an affirmative defense
pursuant to the Cohen standard. The defense does not assume the
80. Robinson calls these defenses "failure of proof' defenses and defines them as
"nothing more than instances where, because of the 'defense,' the prosecution is
unable to prove all the required elements of the offense." ROBINSON, supra note
73, § 21, at 70.
81. See supra note 69 and accompanying text (discussing which defenses constitute
affirmative defenses).
82. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12 (3)(c) (1985)(stating that "a ground of defense is
affirmative, within the meaning of ... this Section, when: . . . (c) it involves a
matter of excuse or justification").
83. See generally ROBINSON, supra note 73, § 22 (discussing failure of proof defense).
84. See generally ROBINSON, supra note 73, §§ 24-25 (discussing justification and ex-
cuse defenses).
85. 568 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 1990).
86. Id. at 51-52.
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charges to be correct; it does not establish a valid excuse, or justifica-
tion, or right to engage in the conduct. It does, however, concern itself
with the elements of the crime, i.e., identity, but it does not concede
them. Furthermore, such a defense does not say, "Yes, I did it, but I
had a good reason." The third-party guilt defense says "No, I did not
do it, and I have evidence of who did."
Afrmative defenses8 7 are also defined by the Model Penal Code as
defenses that are "peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused."8 8
It is easy to see why defenses such as insanity and self-defense consti-
tute affirmative defenses. First, the details of the defense really are
peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused. But the details of the
third-party guilt defense are not "peculiarly within the knowledge of
the accused." In fact, information concerning suspects other than the
accused is often peculiarly within the knowledge of the police or the
prosecution.
Second, a defendant in a criminal case has no constitutional right
to raise an affirmative defense.S9 Therefore, since the government has
the greater right to eliminate the defense entirely, the government
has the lesser right to place limitations or burdens of proof on the ex-
ercise of the gratuitously granted state right. But an accused does
have a constitutional right to adduce evidence "tending to show that a
third party committed the crime charged."9o Hence, because the state
"lacks the greater power to exclude the evidence entirely,"9 1 the state
is also prohibited from placing limitations (i.e., burdens of proof) on
87. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
88. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12(3) (1985)(defining "affirmative defenses").
89. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 681 (1990)(Blackmun, J., dissenting). In
Walton, the dissent discussed the Court's statements in Patterson v. New York,
concluding that Patterson rested upon "the argument that 'the greater power in-
cludes the lesser.' Since the State constitutionally could decline to recognize the
defense [the affumative defense of extreme emotional disturbance] at all, it could
take the lesser step of placing the burden of proof upon the defendant." Id. (citing
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 207-09 (1977)).
90. State v. Koedatich, 548 A.2d 939, 976 (N.J. 1988)("In Chambers v. Mississippi ....
the Supreme Court recognized that an accused has a constitutional right under
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to offer probative evidence
tending to show that a third party committed the crime charged." (citations
omitted)).
91. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 681 (1990)(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
[Tihe Court's decision thus rested upon an argument that "the greater
power includes the lesser": since the State constitutionally could decline
to recognize the defense at all, it could take the lesser step of placing the
burden of proof upon the defendant. That reasoning is simply inapposite
when a capital defendant introduces mitigating evidence, since the State
lacks the greater power to exclude the evidence entirely.
Id. The reason the State lacks the greater power in a capital sentencing proceed-
ing is because the capital accused has a constitutional right to present mitigating
evidence. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
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the defendant's constitutional right to admit third-party guilt
evidence.
Third, third-party guilt evidence resembles an alibi defense,92 and
alibi is not an affirmative defense.93 Alibi does not constitute a justifi-
cation or excuse for committing the crime. It does not have the effect
of saying "I admit I did the crime but I was justified or excused," as is
the case with true affirmative defenses such as insanity or self-de-
fense. Alibi is a defense that negates an element of the crime. It ne-
gates the element of identity.
The government carries the burden of proving two elements in
every case it files and prosecutes. The government must prove that a
crime was committed and that the defendant is the person who com-
92. An alibi defense in essence says "I could not have committed the crime because I
was somewhere else." The third-party guilt defense in essence says "I could not
have committed the crime because someone else did."
93. See, e.g., People v. Huckleberry, 768 P.2d 1235, 1238 (Colo. 1989)("An alibi de-
fense essentially denies that the defendant committed the act charged, while an
affirmative defense basically admits the doing of the act charged, but seeks to
justify, excuse, or mitigate it."). See also State v. Phegley, 826 S.W.2d 348, 355
(Mo. Ct. App. 1992)([A]lthough the allegation is defensive, alibi is not a true
defense. That is because, where the presence of the defendant at the place and
time of the crime is essential to guilt, the burden is always on the prosecution to
prove such presence beyond a reasonable doubt."); Greene v. Texas, 928 S.W.2d
119, 125 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996)("Alibi is not a statutory defense and it is
not an affirmative defense. Alibi is not a defense within the accurate meaning of
the word, but is a fact shown in rebuttal of the state's evidence.").
The majority ofjurisdictions that have confronted this issue have concluded
that alibi is not an affirmative defense. See, e.g., Adkins v. Bordenkircher, 674
F.2d 279, 282 (4th Cir. 1982)("the West Virginia court's characterization of the
alibi as an affirmative defense must be rejected"); Robertson v. Warden, Mary-
land Penitentiary, 466 F. Supp. 262, 263 (D. Md. 1979)("[A]n alibi defense is cer-
tainly not an affirmative defense"); Doisher v. State, 632 P.2d 242 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1981); Harkness v. State, 590 S.W.2d 277 (Ark. 1979); Jackson v. State, 374
A.2d 1 (Del. 1977); People v. Rivera, 390 N.E.2d 1259, 1268 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979);
Williams v. State, 671 P.2d 635 (Nev. 1983); Christian v. State, 555 S.W.2d 863
(Tenn. 1977); Miller v. State, 660 S.W.2d 95 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983)(en banc);
State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 (Utah 1976).
A minority of jurisdictions consider alibi an affirmative defense. See, e.g.,
Simmons v. Dalsheim, 543 F. Supp. 729, 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)("The defense of'al-
ibi' is plainly an affirmative defense that seeks to negate an element of the crime
charged, to wit, the requirement that the defendant must have committed the
acts constituting the crime charged."); State v. Alexander, 245 S.E.2d 633, 637
(W. Va. 1983)("[A]libi is an affirmative defense but does not relieve the prosecu-
tion of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the actual presence of the accused at
the time and place of the commission of the crime when personal presence is es-
sential thereto."); State v. Kopa, 311 S.E.2d 412, 417 n.2 (W. Va. 1983)("In West
Virginia,... alibi has long been characterized as an affirmative defense....
However, this Court recognizes that this characterization ... places West Vir-
ginia in the minority." (citations omitted)).
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mitted the crime.94 The defendant who raises alibi says "I did not do
the crime; I was somewhere else at the time." The government can
constitutionally assign a burden of production to a defendant wishing
to raise the defense of alibi.95 Even if the defendant fails to meet that
burden, the court cannot exclude the defense evidence on this issue
from the jury.96 In other words, the defendant has a constitutional
right to place evidence of alibi before the jury. The jury may not re-
ceive an instruction from the court on his evidence if defendant fails to
meet his burden of production. His evidence on the issue, however,
cannot be totally excluded from consideration by the jury.
A third-party guilt defense sounds like an alibi defense. It says "I
did not do the crime, but I know who did." But the defendant in a
criminal case has the constitutional right to admit alibi evidence.
Does the defendant in a criminal case have the constitutional right to
present evidence of a third party's guilt?
B. The Constitutional Right to Admit Third-Party Guilt
Evidence
The defendant, in raising third-party guilt as a defense, is not rais-
ing identity as a new issue in the case. Identity already is an issue
because it is an element of every criminal offense. But the court, in
imposing a burden of production on the accused and then eliminating
defense evidence that does not meet that burden, is limiting the de-
fense's ability to contest that issue before the jury.
The Sixth Amendment provides that an accused has the right to
compulsory process for obtaining defense witnesses.97 The United
States Supreme Court, in Washington v. Texas,98 interpreted that
amendment as standing for the proposition that "the right to offer the
testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance ... is in plain
94. See FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRMIINAL CASES § 2.03
(1992)("[T]he State has the burden of proving the following two elements: (1) The
crime with which the defendant is charged was committed. (2) The defendant is
the person who committed the crime.").
95. See ROBINSON, supra note 73, § 69 n.8 (citing cases placing the burden of produc-
tion on the defendant for proof of alibi).
96. See id. § 69 n.13 ("Where a burden of production is employed to exclude alibi
evidence rather than to merely deny a special instruction on alibi, this exclusion
may reduce the prosecutor's burden of production.")(citing Constantino v. State,
224 So. 2d 341 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969), for the proposition that "finding that the
exclusion of alibi evidence may have reduced the government's burden of adduc-
ing evidence of the defendant's presence at the crime scene, by eliminating the
need to rebut the defendant's evidence").
97. The Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides that "[iln all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor .... " U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
98. 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
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terms the right to present a defense ...."99 Thus, since 1967, the
Supreme Court has recognized, under the Confrontation Clause of the
Sixth Amendment, the right of a defendant to present reliable and ex-
culpatory evidence and witnesses in his defense. This right is incorpo-
rated through the Fourteenth Amendment and made applicable in all
state prosecutionsoo The state is prevented from arbitrarily exclud-
ing defense evidence.iOi In Washington and in Rock v. Arkansas,1 0 2
the United States Supreme Court held that it was unconstitutional for
a state to use its rules of evidence to preclude entire classes of defense
evidence, specifically accomplice's testimony in Washington and hyp-
notically refreshed testimony in Rock.103
None of the courts that have used the various tests to exclude evi-
dence of a third party's guilt have addressed the argument that the
exclusion of such evidence unconstitutionally shifts the burden of pro-
duction to the defense. While the United States Supreme Court has
not addressed this specific argument, it has dealt with the constitu-
tionality of excluding evidence of a third party's guilt. In Chambers v.
Mississippi,104 the Court "recognized that an accused has a constitu-
tional right under the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment to offer probative evidence tending to show that a third party
committed the crime charged."1 0 5 Likewise, the Court has reversed
trial court decisions where a state or federal court used its procedural
or evidentiary rules to exclude such evidence.iO6
In Chambers, a third party confessed to the crime charged, mur-
der, but then recanted. Chambers wanted to call the third party to the
99. Id. at 19.
100. Id. at 18-19 (recognizing for the first time a defendant's Sixth Amendment right
to present a defense as applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment).
101. Id. at 23 ("The framers of the Constitution did not intend to commit the futile act
of giving to a defendant the right to secure the attendance of witnesses whose
testimony he had no right to use.").
102. 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
103. Id. at 55; Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22-23 (1967).
104. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
105. State v. Koedatich, 548 A.2d 939, 976 (N.J. 1988)(citing Chambers v. Mississippi,
410 U.S. 284 (1973)). The Koedatich court also noted that many state supreme
courts have recognized the same right. Id. (citing State v. Echols, 524 A.2d 1143
(Conn. 1987); State v. Cotton, 351 S.E.2d 277 (N.C. 1987); People v. Hall, 718
P.2d 99 (Cal. 1986); State v. Sturdivant, 155 A.2d 771 (N.J. 1959); State v. Denny,
357 N.W.2d 12 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984)).
106. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973)("Due process is, in es-
sence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations.
..); id. at 302 ([State evidentiary rules] may not be applied mechanistically to
defeat the ends of justice."). See also Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97
(1979)("Regardless of whether the proffered testimony comes within Georgia's
hearsay rule, under the facts of this case its exclusion constituted a violation of
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The excluded testimony
was highly relevant to a critical issue .... ).
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stand and cross-examine him about the confession, but the Mississippi
trial court prohibited the defense from putting the third party on the
stand. The trial court based its ruling on that state's voucher and
hearsay rules. As to voucher, the state rule provided that if a party
placed a witness on the stand, that party vouched for the witness'
credibility and the calling party could not impeach its own witness.
As to hearsay, the third party's confession was an out-of-court state-
ment offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the trial court's exclu-
sion of the proffered third-party guilt evidence, finding that Missis-
sippi's rules could not be applied "mechanistically to defeat the ends of
justice." Likewise, burdens of proof could not be applied mechanisti-
cally to trump the constitutional right of the accused to present third-
party guilt evidence.
In Chambers, it was fair to the state to admit the evidence of the
third party's guilt; the state was in a position to rebut Chambers' evi-
dence because the third party, McDonald, was in court and could be
examined by the state. But what if the third party is not available?
What if he refuses to testify or is otherwise unavailable? How can the
state be in a position to rebut such testimony?
The Court dealt with this issue in Green v. Georgia.JOy In Green,
the defendant sought to prove that he was not present at the crime
scene when his codefendant committed a murder. Green attempted to
introduce the testimony of another witness who had testified for the
state at the codefendant's trial. According to the new witness' testi-
mony, the codefendant told the witness that the codefendant shot the
victim after ordering Green to run an errand. The trial court excluded
the evidence under the hearsay provision of Georgia's evidence code.
The Court, in reversing Green's conviction and in ordering the ad-
mission of the testimony, emphasized that because the state had
found the proffered evidence sufficiently reliable to use it against the
co-defendant and base a sentence of death upon it, that the testimony
was reliable enough to be admitted in Green's trial. In essence, since
the state had used the statement to get a death sentence in another
trial, it was unfair to refuse to admit the hearsay statement in Green's
trial.108 Similarly, a defendant (1) who has some evidence of a third
party's guilt, but that party has not confessed, or (2) who lacks a large
quantum of evidence of the third party's guilt, perhaps can argue
based on Green that it would be unfair to allow the state to exclude
such evidence merely because the state has chosen to target, charge,
and develop the evidence against the defendant as opposed to the
third party. After all, the defendant's evidence against the third party
107. 442 U.S. 95 (1979).
108. Id. at 97.
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might be insubstantial because it had to be secured without the inves-
tigatory power and cooperation of the prosecutor and other law en-
forcement agencies. Why should the defendant be punished because
the state selected the defendant for prosecution as opposed to the
third party?
Even if a defendant has a constitutional right to present certain
evidence, the government can place some conditions on the exercise of
those rights. A defendant, for example, has a constitutional right to
testify, but the defendant cannot take the stand and refuse to be cross-
examined. Therefore, the state could probably constitutionally re-
quire pretrial notice when a defendant intends to present evidence of a
third party's guilt, which would require the defendant to provide the
particulars of the defense to the state.
But the government can go only so far. The government could not,
for example, place the burden of production for the alibi defense on the
accused and then exclude any alibi evidence because the defendant
failed to satisfy his burden of production.10 9
The Supreme Court has, on occasion, upheld exclusions of defense
evidence over Sixth Amendment objections based upon the govern-
ment's need to ensure reliable and fair trials. The defendant's right to
present such evidence is not absolute, and "[in the exercise of this
right, the accused, as is required of the State, must comply with estab-
lished rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both fair-
ness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence."1 10 If
the state interest is strong enough, even relevant and reliable evi-
dence can be excluded.11 In this regard, the "Sixth Amendment does
not confer the right to present testimony free from the legitimate de-
mands of the adversarial system."1 2
109. See State v. McGarry, 83 N.W. 718, 719 (Iowa 1900)(stating that alibi evidence "is
admissible always, without regard to its weight, and is for the consideration of
the jury").
110. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973).
111. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 n.21 (1967)(referring to the exclusion of
evidence under testimonial privileges such as the attorney-client privilege).
112. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 241 (1975). In Nobles, the defense attor-
ney's investigator interviewed pretrial certain key prosecution witnesses. During
the trial, defense counsel sought to impeach the in-court testimony of those prose-
cution witnesses by calling the investigator to the stand to testify to certain prior
inconsistent statements. The trial court said the investigator's report, after an in
camera hearing excising any matters irrelevant to the witnesses' statements,
would have to be given to the prosecution after the investigator testified. When
defense counsel stated they did not intend to produce the report, the court ruled
the investigator could not testify about his conversations with the prosecution
witnesses. The Supreme Court upheld the preclusion sanction, stating that "[tihe
Sixth Amendment does not confer the right to present testimony free from the
legitimate demands of the adversarial system; one cannot invoke the Sixth
Amendment as a justification for presenting what might have been a half truth."
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The Supreme Court had occasion to explore the conflict between
defense witness preclusion and the Sixth Amendment right to present
a defense in Taylor v. Illinois.ii3 In Taylor, the trial court excluded
an important defense witness who was not disclosed to the state until
after the trial had begun. The Court, in rejecting the defense argu-
ment that the preclusion sanction is unconstitutional per se,1 14 dis-
cussed the court's role in ensuring the reliability of evidence admitted
at trial. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, stated that "[iut is
' reasonable to presume that there is something suspect about a
defense witness who is not identified until the 11th hour has
passed.""i 5 Justice Stevens stated that the Sixth Amendment did not
"allow presumptively peijured testimony to be presented to a jury,"116
and the "mere invocation of that right [to offer the testimony of wit-
nesses on a defendant's behalf] cannot automatically and invariably
outweigh countervailing public interests.""i 7 Justice Stevens called
for a balancing process to protect the "integrity of the adversary pro-
cess, which depends both on the presentation of reliable evidence and
the rejection of unreliable evidence, the interest in the fair and effi-
cient administration of justice, and the potential prejudice to the
truth-determining function of the trial process. .. ."118
Thus, courts have upheld the exclusion of a witness when a party
willfully violates the discovery rules to gain a tactical advantage in
litigation. "In Taylor, for instance, it was 'plain that the case fit into
the category of willful misconduct in which the severest sanction is
appropriate.'"" 9 Moreover, "most circuit court cases affirming exclu-
113. 484 U.S. 400 (1988).
114. Id. at 410-16. See also Lori Ann Irish, Alibi Notice Rules: The Preclusion Sanc-
tion as Procedural Default, 51 U. Cm. L. Rav. 254, 255 (1984)(arguing that the
use of the preclusion sanction for a violation of alibi notice rules is not a 'denial of
a constitutional right but merely the consequence of a defendant's failure to
[timely] assert the constitutional right [to testify/present an alibi] at the appro-
priate point in the litigation).
115. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 414 (1988).
116. Id. at 416.
117. Id. at 414.
118. Id. at 415. See also Fendler v. Goldsmith, 728 F.2d 1181, 1188 (9th Cir.
1984)("[C]ourts should impose a sanction only after a careful weighing of the in-
terest of the defendant in a full and fair trial against the interests of avoiding
surprise and delays."); John W. Heiderscheit, I, Taylor v. Illinois: The New Ap-
proach to Defense Witness Preclusion Sanctions for Criminal Discovery Rule Vio-
lations, 23 GA. L. Rav. 479, 508 (1989)(arguing that "[pireclusion will be upheld
only where the state interests in preventing prejudice, vindicating court author-
ity, deterring future abuse, and protecting the integrity of the evidence outweigh
the defendant's interest in not complying with the prosecution discovery re-
quest"); Alexander Schure, Note, Taylor v. Illinois: Compulsory Process vs. The
Preclusion Sanction, 10 WHrITIER L. Ryv. 741, 760-61 (1989)(discussing the
weighing and balancing required in a due process analysis).
119. Bowling v. Vose, 3 F.3d 559, 561 (1st Cir. 1993).
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sion in response to discovery violations involve willful conduct."12o
The Ninth Circuit went further, interpreting Taylor to mean that ex-
clusion is permissible only when the case involves misconduct. 12 1
But there are two differences between the Taylor facts and third-
party guilt evidence. First, third-party guilt evidence, unlike the evi-
dence in Taylor, is not "presumptively peijured" testimony; it does not
involve misconduct. 122 Second, contrary to Taylor, third-party guilt
evidence need not meet the same standards of reliability that other
defense evidence must meet.123 Thus, since the accused in a criminal
case has a constitutional right to admit third-party guilt evidence, and
since such evidence constitutes neither an affirmative defense nor evi-
dence of misconduct, the exclusion of any such evidence is
unconstitutional.
The defendant has a constitutional right to admit evidence that
someone else committed the crime charged. The government might be
able to require him to give notice of his intent to rely on a defense of
third-party guilt, thereby forcing him to divulge the particulars of that
defense pretrial.124 Courts, however, cannot constitutionally prohibit
the defendant from introducing any evidence that someone else com-
mitted the crime unless the defendant presents a requisite quantum
of evidence. This is particularly true where the defendant's inability
to obtain enough evidence is due to the state's decision to prosecute
the defendant as opposed to the third party.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 562.
122. Id.
123. See Perry v. Watts, 520 F. Supp. 550, 556 (N.D. Cal. 1981)("[T]he federal cases
indicate that the discretion of the trial judge may not be exercised as broadly as
in the California courts in excluding evidence that a third party committed the
crime charged, and there appears to be a definite preference for the admission of
such evidence."). The District Court for the Northern District of California com-
mented on the lenient federal rule of admissibility of third-party guilt evidence
stating that
although the federal courts have not established a standard test to be
applied in all cases where evidence that a third party may have commit-
ted a charged offense is sought to be introduced, the courts are lenient in
allowing such evidence, and minimize the discretion in the trial judge to
exclude such evidence.
Id. at 557 (footnote omitted). See also People v. Hall, 718 P.2d 99, 117 (Cal.
1986)(stating that California courts "should avoid a hasty conclusion such as the
trial court's finding in the present case that evidence of a third party's guilt was
'incredible.' Such a determination is properly the province of the jury.").
124. Such is the case when the accused seeks to raise the defense of alibi. See, e.g.,
FLA. R. CRM. P. 3.200 (requiring pretrial notice of a defendant's intent to raise an
alibi defense and requiring the defendant to include in the notice where he was at
the time of the crime and the names and addresses of the witnesses who will
establish such facts). Such procedures have been found to be constitutional. See





Federal and state courts use various tests to determine the admis-
sibility of third-party guilt evidence, and each test constitutes a state-
imposed burden of production. Because third-party guilt evidence
does not constitute an afirmative defense, and because the accused in
a criminal trial has the constitutional right to introduce such evi-
dence, it is unconstitutional to exclude the evidence pursuant to any
existing test.125
In 1978, four young black males were arrested, tried, and convicted
for a brutal rape and double murder.l26 The four denied their guilt,
but despite their claims of innocence, they served eighteen years in
prison before being released in 1996.127 They were released because
they were innocent; someone else committed the crimes with which
they were charged. In 1980, Kevin Lee Green was tried and convicted
for murdering his unborn baby and nearly beating his wife to
death.1 28 Green maintained his innocence before, during, and after
his conviction. Green served seventeen years in prison. But he was
innocent. He was freed in 1996, and now an imprisoned rapist has
been charged with the murder of Green's baby and the attack on his
wife. 129
We may be unable to prevent the conviction of all innocent people
by admitting third-party guilt evidence, but we surely cannot protect
innocent people if we shift the burden of proof to the defendant, who is
usually incarcerated and ill equipped to investigate whether someone
125. If the trial court must admit all third-party guilt evidence, there is some concern
that the introduction of such evidence by the defense and the rebuttal of this
evidence by the prosecution will waste valuable resources of trial courts. The
trial court, however, could place time limits on the defense and the prosecution
for the introduction and rebuttal of this evidence. See United States v. Reaves,
636 F. Supp. 1575 (E.D. Ky. 1986)(imposing time limits on various stages of the
trial in a tax fraud case). See also Patrick E. Longan, The Shot Clock Comes to
Trial: Time Limits for Federal Civil Trials, 35 Aiuz. L. Rav. 663 (1993). Profes-
sor Longan discusses a proposal submitted by the United States Supreme Court
to the Congress to amend Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to "per-
mit trial judges to enter 'an order establishing a reasonable limit on the length of
time allowed for the presentation of evidence." Id. at 664-65. Longan argues
that "[tirials without judicial intervention will tend to last too long. The parties
do not take into account the costs to the system or to other litigants when they
calculate how long to take in trial." Id. at 718 (internal citations omitted). He
concludes that "[ilf there is room to shorten trials and not sacrifice justice in the
cases that are tried, courts should do so." Id.
126. Editorials, At Risk of Executing the Innocent Series, ST. PaIRasBuRG Tnlms, June
21, 1996, at A14, available in Lexis, News Library, Papers File.
127. Id.
128. Anna Cekola & H.G. Renza, O.C. Grand Jury Heard Parker Admit 6 Killings,
LA Tnzs, August 20, 1996, available in 1996 WL 11636641.
129. Id.
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else committed the crime. After all, we already admit much third-
party guilt evidence. Surely, we can afford to admit the rest.
